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Department of State TELEGRAM

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TAGS: PEPR, SA, US

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S AWACS TESTIMONY OF OCTOBER 5 TEXT:

TESTIMONY BY THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG JR. SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OCTOBER 5, 1981. BEGIN TEXT - I WANT TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT TWO KEY POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THOSE WHO APPARENTLY OPPOSE IT.

GIVEN ALL THE CONTROVERSY, THERE IS A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT. WE ARE UNITED IN OUR DESIRES TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE UNITED IN OUR COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING A STRONG AND SECURE ISRAEL. WE AGREE ABOUT THE NEED TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE GREATLY INCREASED MILITARY THREATS TO THIS VITAL REGION.

WE AGREE ABOUT MANY SPECIFICS AS WELL. WE ALL AGREE THAT HAVING AWACS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION IS IN OUR INTERESTS NOW AND WILL REMAIN SO IN THE FUTURE. WE ALL AGREE THAT IT MIGHT BE MILITARILY DESIRABLE IF WE COULD HAVE THE DEGREE OF ASSURED JOINT CONTROL THAT WOULD PERMIT US TO PUT THE MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE ON BOARD THESE AIRCRAFT. WE ALL AGREE, AS SENATOR BIDEN PUT IT, THAT THERE WILL BE DAMAGE DONE IF THIS PROPOSED SALE IS DISAPPROVED.

WHY, THEN, IS THERE SO MUCH DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD DO, WHEN THERE IS SO MUCH AGREEMENT NOT JUST ON BROAD OBJECTIVES BUT ON SPECIFIC DETAILS? OBVIOUSLY, WHEN DIFFICULT CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE BALANCED, THERE IS PLENTY OF ROOM FOR HONEST DISAGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT SOME WHO OPPOSE THIS SALE MAY BE IN DANGER OF COMFORTING THEMSELVES WITH TWO DANGEROUS ILLUSIONS.

FIRST IS THE ILLUSION THAT INSTEAD OF THE PROPOSED SALE WE COULD HAVE SOME KIND OF JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT THE SALE OF AWACS WITH ALL OF THE MOST ADVANCED AND SENSITIVE GEAR ON BOARD.

SECOND IS THE ILLUSION THAT, EVEN IF THIS SALE IS NOT APPROVED, THE DAMAGE TO U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS CAN BE EASILY REPAIRED BECAUSE WE WILL STILL HAVE SO MANY COMMON INTERESTS.

I SHARE SENATOR GLENN'S DESIRE TO SEE THE BEST AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY POSSIBLE, ONE THAT CAN MOST READILY ASSIST OUR OWN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. BUT LET ME SAY THAT WE ARE IN GREAT DANGER OF LETTING THE BEST BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD. THE KIND OF JOINT COMMAND THAT HE IS TALKING ABOUT IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE NOW. THEREFORE, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO POINT WHATSOEVER IN COMPARING THE PRESENT PROPOSAL WITH SOME IMAGINARY, EVEN IF HIGHLY DESIRABLE, JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENT.

THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD GOVERN THESE PROPOSED SALES ARE THE PRODUCT OF LONG AND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA. ATTACHED TO MY STATEMENT IS A CHART THAT COMPARES THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS SALE WITH THE TERMS OF A STANDARD LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE THAT GOVERNS MOST U.S. ARMS SALES. AS YOU CAN SEE VERY CLEARLY, THESE ARRANGEMENTS GO FAR BEYOND ANYTHING THAT IS NORMALLY CONTAINED IN A MILITARY SALES AGREEMENT.

THE CHOICE BEFORE YOU IS NOT BETWEEN THESE AGREED ARRANGEMENTS AND SOME STILL MORE FAVORABLE ONES. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER U.S. INTERESTS ARE BETTER SERVED BY THE KIND OF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM WE ARE PROPOSING OR BY THE KIND OF SYSTEM THAT WOULD BE SUPPLIED BY BRITAIN OR BY SOME OTHER THIRD COUNTRY.

-- IS IT BETTER TO HAVE ASSURED ACCESS TO THE RADAR INFORMATION OF THIS SYSTEM OR TO HAVE NO ASSURANCE OF ACCESS WHATSOEVER?

-- IS IT BETTER TO HAVE THE ASSURANCE THAT NO INFORMATION FROM THIS SYSTEM WILL BE PASSED TO THIRD PARTIES WITHOUT OUR CONSENT OR TO HAVE A SYSTEM WITH NO SUCH CONTROL AT ALL?

-- IS IT BETTER TO HAVE A SYSTEM IN WHICH AMERICANS PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE AND FROM WHICH THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS ARE EXCLUDED OR TO HAVE A SYSTEM IN WHICH OUR PLACE IS TAKEN BY BRITISH OR FRENCH -- OR, FOR THAT MATTER, BY ANY OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS WHO MIGHT BE BROUGHT IN TO OPERATE A NON-U.S. SYSTEM?

-- IS IT BETTER TO HAVE AWACS EARLY WARNING INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO U.S. FORCES IN THE REGION, FROM NOW INTO THE INDEFINITE FUTURE, OR TO LOSE THIS EARLY WARNING WHEN WE WITHDRAW THE U.S. AWACS THAT, AT SAUDI REQUEST, ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED BECAUSE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT?

-- IS IT BETTER TO HAVE A SYSTEM THAT CAN BE RAPIDLY UPGRADED IN AN EMERGENCY AND WHICH PROVIDES THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL AWACS AIRCRAFT OF OUR OWN IF NEEDED OR TO HAVE NONE OF THOSE ADVANTAGES AND TO CREATE A POLITICAL OBSTACLE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF OUR OWN AWACS, BOTH NOW AND IN THE FUTURE?

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ANSWERS TO ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS ARE SIMPLE AND OBVIOUS.

MORE ADVANTAGEOUS ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE IMAGINED, BUT THEY ARE JUST NOT POSSIBLE. AT LEAST NOT NOW. AND THEY WILL NOT BE MADE MORE POSSIBLE BY DEFEATING THE PRESENT PROPOSAL.

IF THE PRESIDENT RECEIVES YOUR SUPPORT ON THIS PROPOSAL, I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT OUR SECURITY COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA WILL GROW STILL CLOSER IN THE FUTURE. BUT THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH COOPERATION WILL BE SET BACK BADLY IF THIS SALE IS DEFEATED. BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THAT.

I URGE YOU ALSO NOT TO COMFORT YOURSELVES WITH THE ILLUSION THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE NO PLACE ELSE TO GO; OR WITH THE THOUGHT THAT DAMAGE TO U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS CAN

BE REPAIRED OVER TIME.

WITHOUT QUESTION, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE FAR-REACHING COMMON INTERESTS WITH SAUDI ARABIA EVEN IF THIS SALE IS DEFEATED. IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE FOR ME TO UTTER PROPHESIES OF DOOM, PROPHESIES THAT COULD ALL TOO EASILY BECOME SELF-FULFILLING. BUT MAKE NO MISTAKE, IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE IN THE EXTREME TO SUCCUMB TO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE REAL ALTERNATIVES FACING US.

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER SAUDI ARABIA WILL JOIN THE RANKS OF OUR ENEMIES. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN FAR AHEAD OF US IN RECOGNIZING AND WARNING AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE PERSIAN GULF. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER SAUDI ARABIA WILL WITHDRAW FROM A MODERATING LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNCILS AND SEEK INSTEAD THE PROTECTION THAT A LOWER PROFILE AFFORDS.

OVER THE LAST YEAR, SAUDI ARABIA HAS INCREASINGLY EMERGED AS A CONSTRUCTIVE AND MODERATING INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. THEY HAVE SHOWN THIS IN THEIR DIPLOMACY IN LEBANON, IN THEIR LEADERSHIP IN CREATING THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, AND IN THEIR BILATERAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH MODERATE STATES THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THAT ROLE ENTAILS RISKS -- AND MAY WELL ENTAIL STILL GREATER RISKS IN THE FUTURE -- AND IT WILL NOT BE EASIER FOR SAUDI ARABIA TO RUN THESE RISKS IF THEY ARE PUBLICLY REBUFFED BY THEIR CLOSEST FRIEND IN THE WEST.

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER DAMAGE TO U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS CAN BE REPAIRED, GIVEN TIME AND THE EXTENT OF OUR COMMON INTERESTS. SHOULD THE CONGRESS DECIDE TO OVERRULE THE PRESIDENT, YOU WILL FIND ME WORKING AS HARD AS ANYONE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE TO U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER WE WILL HAVE ENOUGH TIME.

FOR TIME IS NOT NECESSARILY ON OUR SIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND IN BUILDING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. WE HOPE TO CONTINUE THAT PROGRESS.

BUT OUR ENEMIES AND THE ENEMIES OF PEACE HAVE NOT BEEN IDLE. JUST LAST WEEK, IRANIAN PLANES BOMBED OIL FACILITIES IN KUWAIT AND THE TURMOIL IN IRAN ITSELF POSES EVEN LARGER DANGERS TO U.S. INTERESTS AND TO WORLD PEACE. LIBYA, ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN HAVE RECENTLY JOINED TOGETHER IN AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE AIMED THROUGH THE SUDAN AT EGYPT AND THROUGH NORTH YEMEN AT SAUDI ARABIA. QADHAFI HAS THREATENED TO DESTROY THE OIL FACILITIES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND HIS PLANES HAVE BOMBED THE SUDAN. THE FRAGILE CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON IS THE TARGET OF ALL THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, FOR THEY RECOGNIZE THAT WAR IN LEBANON COULD WELL MAKE PEACE IMPOSSIBLE.

WE NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR FRIENDS AND WE NEED TO WORK QUICKLY. OUR MARGIN FOR ERROR AND DELAY IS DANGEROUSLY THIN. THIS IS NOT A TIME TO IMPOSE SEVERE STRAIN ON OUR RELATIONS WITH ONE OF OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS IN THE REGION. I URGE YOU TO KEEP THAT IN MIND AS YOU CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR YOUR SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE.

PROPOSED SAUDI AWACS SALE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS

STANDARD AGREEMENT

USE OF AWACS	DEFENSIVE USE ONLY
SECURITY OF TECHNOLOGY	PROTECT CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT WITH PROCEDURES SIMILAR TO U.S. PROCEDURES
THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS	NO TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT WITHOUT USG APPROVAL
INFORMATION SHARING	NONE

SAUDI ADDITIONS TO STANDARD AGREEMENT

1. NO FLIGHTS OUTSIDE BORDERS (WITHOUT USG PRIOR CONSENT)

1. USG APPROVAL OF SECURITY PLAN
2. USG INSPECTIONS
3. HIGH TECHNOLOGY SECURITY FACILITIES
4. ONLY US AND SAUDI PERSONNEL HAVE ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTATION
5. NEW INFORMATION SECURITY AGREEMENT
6. COMPUTER SOFTWARE (MACHINE LANGUAGE) REMAINS USG PROPERTY

1. THIRD COUNTRY MODIFICATIONS TO EQUIPMENT FORBIDDEN
2. THIRD COUNTRY PERSONNEL FORBIDDEN TO PERFORM MAINTENANCE

1. AWACS DATA EXCHANGED BETWEEN US AND SAUDI ARABIA AT ALL TIMES
2. NO AWACS DATA TO OTHER COUNTRIES WITHOUT PRIOR AND MUTUAL CONSENT OF U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA. HAIG